Conspiracy

A conspiracy is an agreement between two or more people to join together to attempt to accomplish some unlawful purpose. It is a kind of "partnership in crime" in which each member becomes the agent of every other member. It does not matter whether or not the conspiracy was successful. The essence of the offense is that two or more persons have combined, or mutually agreed, to do something illegal.

The essence of the crime of conspiracy is the agreement. United Statesv. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205, 210 (1940). Stated another way, without an agreement there can be no conspiracy. Further, because the agreement is the crime, success of the conspiracy is irrelevant. United States v. Labat, 905 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Nicoll, 664 F.2d 1308, 1315 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1118 (1982); United States v. Kibby, 848 F.2d 920, 922 (8th Cir. 1988). It is for this reason that a defendant may be charged with conspiracy as well as the substantive offense which served as the object of the conspiracy. Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 791 (1975); Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 645-46 (1946).
The agreement need not be expressly stated or be in writing or cover all the details of how it is to be carried out. United States v. DePew, 932 F.2d 324, 328 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 210 (1991); United States v. Hopkins, 916 F.2d 207, 212 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Pearce, 912 F.2d 159, 161 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1093 (1991); United States v. Powell, 853 F.2d 601, 604 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. Boone, 951 F.2d 1526, 1543 (9th Cir. 1992).
Rather, the existence of an agreement may be proved by inference from the actions and statements of the conspirators or from the surrounding circumstances of the scheme. Glasser v. United States , 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942); United States v. Mariani, 725 F.2d 862, 865-66 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Ellzey, 874 F.2d 324, 328 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. Ballard, 663 F.2d 534, 543 (6th Cir. 1981); United States v. Penagos, 823 F.2d 346, 348 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Young, 954 F.2d 614, 618-19 (10th Cir. 1992).
Moreover, the government is not required to prove that the members of the conspiracy directly stated to each other the purpose of the agreement or all of the details of the agreement. United States v. Schultz, 855 F.2d 1217, 1221 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. McNeese, 901 F.2d 585, 599 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Gonzalez, 940 F.2d 1413, 1417 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 910 (1992).

23.04[2] Two or More Persons

A defendant cannot conspire with himself or herself. Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 92 (1934). In order to establish the existence of an agreement, the government must show that the defendant and at least one other person reached an understanding or agreement to carry out the objective of the conspiracy. United States v. Giry, 818 F.2d 120, 125 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 855 (1987); United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 161 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907 (1980); United States v. Chase, 372 F.2d 453, 459 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 907 (1967); Sears v. United States, 343 F.2d 139, 141-42 (5th Cir. 1965).
It makes no difference whether that other person is another defendant or even named in the indictment. Rodgers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 375 (1951) ("identity of the other members of the conspiracy is not needed, inasmuch as one person can be convicted of conspiring with persons whose names are unknown"). See also United States v. Allen, 613 F.2d 1248, 1253 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. Anderson, 611 F.2d 504, 511 (4th Cir. 1979); United States v. Lewis, 902 F.2d 1176, 1181 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Rey, 923 F.2d 1217, 1222 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Galvan, 961 F.2d 738, 742 (8th Cir. 1992).

23.04[2][b] Conspiring With Government Agents

Because there must be at least two culpable parties to reach an agreement, proof of an agreement solely between a defendant and a government agent or informer will not support a conspiracy conviction. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 375 (1951); Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 92 (1934); United States v. Giry, 818 F.2d 120, 125 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 855 (1987); United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 161 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907 (1980); United States v. Chase, 372 F.2d 453, 459 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 907 (1967); United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 536 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1158 (1985); United States v. Escobar de Bright, 742 F.2d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir. 1984).
Even though it is impossible to conspire with an undercover agent or informer, this issue should be distinguished from instances where a valid agreement exists between two or more conspirators, one of whom committed overt acts solely with a government agent. In these situations, it is proper to charge and prove at trial an overt act that involves only one of the conspirators and an undercover agent. United States v. Enstam, 622 F.2d 857, 867 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981).

23.04[2][c] Corporations as Conspirators

A corporation may be criminally liable for conspiracy under section 371. United States v. S & Vee Cartage Co., 704 F.2d 914, 920 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 935 (1983); United States v. Stevens, 909 F.2d 431, 432-34 (11th Cir. 1990). Moreover, a corporation can enter into a conspiracy with its own employees. United States v. Ams Sintering Co., 927 F.2d 232, 236 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 972 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983).

23.04[3] Scope of the Agreement -- Single or Multiple Objects

A single conspiracy may have multiple objectives which involve a number of sub-agreements to commit each of the specified objectives. Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 53 (1942); United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934, 963 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2811 (1991); United States v. Rodriguez, 585 F.2d 1234, 1248-49 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Warner, 690 F.2d 545, 550 n.8 (6th Cir. 1982). In these cases, the issue of single or multiple conspiracies is frequently raised. Such a determination looks to whether there is one agreement to commit multiple objectives or more than one agreement, each with a separate object.
The general test is whether there was "one overall agreement" to perform various functions to achieve the objectives of the conspiracy. United States v. Leavis, 853 F.2d 215, 218 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Warner, 690 F.2d 545, 548-49 (6th Cir. 1982); United States v. Springer, 831 F.2d 781, 784 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Arbelaez, 719 F.2d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1255 (1984).
A single conspiracy does not become multiple conspiracies simply because of personnel changes or because its members are cast in different roles. United States v. Cambindo-Valencia, 609 F.2d 603, 625 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 940 (1980); United States v. Richerson, 833 F.2d 1147, 1153-54 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Spector, 793 F.2d 932, 935-36 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987); United States v. Mayes, 512 F.2d 637, 642 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1008 (1975). In determining this issue, the courts apply a totality of the circumstances test under which a combination of the following factors are considered: (1) commonality of goals; (2) nature of the scheme; and (3) overlapping of participants in the various dealings. United States v. Smith, 789 F.2d 196, 201-02 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987); United States v. Marable, 578 F.2d 151, 154 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Bastone, 526 F.2d 971, 979-80 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 973 (1976); United States v. DeLuna, 763 F.2d 897, 918 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985); United States v. Mayo, 646 F.2d 369, 372 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1127 (1981); United States v. David, 940 F.2d 722, 724 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Plotke, 725 F.2d 1303, 1308 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 843 (1984); United States v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1392-93 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 840 (1988).

23.05 MEMBERSHIP
23.05[1] Intent Requirement

In order to establish a defendant's membership in a conspiracy, the government must prove that the defendant knew of the conspiracy and that he or she intended to join it and to accomplish the object of the conspiracy. United States v. Flaherty, 668 F.2d 566, 580 (1st Cir. 1981); United States v. Southland, 760 F.2d 1366, 1169 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 825 (1985); United States v. Rankin, 870 F.2d 109, 113 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 840 (1989); United States v. Norris, 749 F.2d 1116, 1121 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1065 (1985); United States v. Yanin, 868 F.2d 130, 133 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 924 (1989); United States v. Christian, 786 F.2d 203, 211 (6th Cir. 1986); United States v. Brown, 934 F.2d 886, 889 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Zimmerman, 832 F.2d 454, 457 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Esparza, 876 F.2d 1390, 1392 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Lynch, 934 F.2d 1226, 1231 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 885 (1992); United States v. Dale, 991 F.2d 819, 851 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 286, 650 (1993). A defendant may become a member of a conspiracy without knowing all of the details of the unlawful scheme and without knowing all of the members. Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 557 (1947); United States v. Diecidue, 603 F.2d 535, 548 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 F.2d 946 (1980); United States v. Noble, 754 F.2d 1324, 1327 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 818 (1985); United States v. Massa, 740 F.2d 629, 636 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985); United States v. Horn, 946 F.2d 738, 740 (10th Cir. 1991).
Similarly, a defendant may become a member of a conspiracy even if that person agrees to play a minor role in the conspiracy, so long as he or she understands the essential nature of the scheme and intentionally joins in it. United States v. Warner, 690 F.2d 545, 550 (6th Cir. 1982); United States v. Medina, 940 F.2d 1247, 1250 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Andrews, 953 F.2d 1312, 1318 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3007 (1992). Further, the government is not required to prove any special mens rea beyond the degree of criminal intent required for the object offense. United Statesv. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 686-96 (1975).

23.05[2] Proof of Membership

Although the government must prove that a defendant was a member of a conspiracy, this may be satisfied by a showing of only a "slight connection" to the conspiracy, i.e., circumstantial evidence as to the defendant's knowledge of the conspiracy and its scope. United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 253 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v. Christian, 786 F.2d 203, 211 (6th Cir. 1986); United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 758 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492 F.2d 908 (1989); United States v. Ivey, 915 F.2d 380, 384 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Boone, 951 F.2d 1526, 1543 (9th Cir. 1991).
Thus, a defendant's knowledge of a conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence; circumstantial evidence is sufficient. United States v. David, 940 F.2d 722, 724 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 605 (1991); United States v. Christian, 786 F.2d 203, 211 (6th Cir. 1986); United States v. Beale, 921 F.2d 1412, 1430 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 99 (1991). Generally, this knowledge can be inferred from the defendant's own acts and statements. United States v. Martin, 920 F.2d 345, 348 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2038 (1991); United States v. Kane, 944 F.2d 1406, 1410 (7th Cir. 1991).
However, mere presence at the scene of a transaction or event is insufficient, of itself, to make someone a member of a conspiracy. United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980, 1003 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 913 (1987); United States v. Marian, 725 F.2d 862, 865 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Holcomb, 797 F.2d 1320, 1327 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Bostic, 480 F.2d 965, 968 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Raymond, 793 F.2d 928, 932 (8th Cir. 1986).
Similarly, merely acting in the same way as others or merely associating with others does not prove that someone joined in an agreement or understanding. United States v. Davenport, 808 F.2d 1212, 1218 (6th Cir. 1987); United States v. Apker, 705 F.2d 293, 298 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984). Also, mere knowledge that something illegal is going on is insufficient to show membership in a conspiracy. United States v. Webb, 359 F.2d 558, 562 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 F.2d 824 (1966); United States v. Brown, 584 F.2d 252, 260 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 910 (1979); United States v. Schmidt, 947 F.2d 362, 365 (9th Cir. 1991).

23.05[3] Pinkerton Liability

A conspirator is responsible for offenses committed by another member of the conspiracy if the conspirator was a member of the conspiracy when the offense was committed and if the offense was committed in furtherance of, or as a foreseeable consequence of, the conspiracy. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 645-48 (1946). The government is not required to prove that each defendant specifically agreed or knew that the offense would be committed. United States v. Etheridge, 424 F.2d 951, 965 (6th Cir. 1970); United States v. Lemm, 680 F.2d 1193, 1204 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110 (1983). Rather, it is sufficient if the government establishes that the offense was in furtherance of the conspiracy or was reasonably foreseen as a necessary or natural consequence of the unlawful agreement. United States v. Labat, 905 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Cummings, 937 F.2d 941, 944 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 395 (1991); United States v. Tilton, 610 F.2d 302, 309 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Van Hee, 531 F.2d 352, 357 (6th Cir. 1976); United States v. Redwine, 715 F.2d 315, 322 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1216 (1984); United States v. Heater, 689 F.2d 783, 788 (8th Cir. 1982); United States v. Carpenter, 961 F.2d 824, 828 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 332 (1992); United States v. Eyster, 948 F.2d 1196, 1206 (11th Cir. 1991).
Moreover, there is some authority for the proposition that a person who joins a conspiracy adopts the prior acts of the other conspirators and may be held responsible for offenses committed before he or she joined the conspiracy. United States v. Rea, 958 F.2d 1206, 1214 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Cimini, 427 F.2d 129, 130 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970).

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