PENAL CODE TITLE 2.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY

CHAPTER 6. CULPABILITY GENERALLY

§ 6.01. REQUIREMENT OF VOLUNTARY ACT OR
OMISSION. (a) A person commits an offense only if he voluntarily
engages in conduct, including an act, an omission, or possession.
(b) Possession is a voluntary act if the possessor knowingly
obtains or receives the thing possessed or is aware of his control
of the thing for a sufficient time to permit him to terminate his
control.
(c) A person who omits to perform an act does not commit an
offense unless a law as defined by Section 1.07 provides that the
omission is an offense or otherwise provides that he has a duty to
perform the act.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974.
Amended by Acts 1975, 64th Leg., p. 913, ch. 342, § 3, eff. Sept.
1, 1975; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 3, § 1, eff. Feb. 25, 1993;
Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, § 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

§ 6.02. REQUIREMENT OF CULPABILITY. (a) Except as
provided in Subsection (b), a person does not commit an offense
unless he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal
negligence engages in conduct as the definition of the offense
requires.
(b) If the definition of an offense does not prescribe a
culpable mental state, a culpable mental state is nevertheless
required unless the definition plainly dispenses with any mental
element.
(c) If the definition of an offense does not prescribe a
culpable mental state, but one is nevertheless required under
Subsection (b), intent, knowledge, or recklessness suffices to
establish criminal responsibility.
(d) Culpable mental states are classified according to
relative degrees, from highest to lowest, as follows:
(1) intentional;
(2) knowing;
(3) reckless;
(4) criminal negligence.
(e) Proof of a higher degree of culpability than that
charged constitutes proof of the culpability charged.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974.
Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, § 1.01, eff. Sept. 1,
1994.

§ 6.03. DEFINITIONS OF CULPABLE MENTAL STATES. (a) A
person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the
nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his
conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the
result.
(b) A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect
to the nature of his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his
conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or that the
circumstances exist. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge,
with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.
(c) A person acts recklessly, or is reckless, with respect
to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his
conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or
the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree
that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard
of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.
(d) A person acts with criminal negligence, or is criminally
negligent, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or
the result of his conduct when he ought to be aware of a substantial
and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result
will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the
failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all
the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974.
Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, § 1.01, eff. Sept. 1,
1994.

§ 6.04. CAUSATION: CONDUCT AND RESULTS. (a) A person
is criminally responsible if the result would not have occurred but
for his conduct, operating either alone or concurrently with
another cause, unless the concurrent cause was clearly sufficient
to produce the result and the conduct of the actor clearly
insufficient.
(b) A person is nevertheless criminally responsible for
causing a result if the only difference between what actually
occurred and what he desired, contemplated, or risked is that:
(1) a different offense was committed; or
(2) a different person or property was injured,
harmed, or otherwise affected.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974.
Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, § 1.01, eff. Sept. 1,
1994.

 

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